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There is increasing pressure for reduction of user fees, but this can have adverse
effects by decreasing facility-level funds. To address this, direct facility funding
(DFF) was piloted in Coast Province, Kenya, with health facility committees
(HFCs) responsible for managing the funds. We evaluated the implementation
and perceived impact 2.5 years after DFF introduction.
Quantitative data collection at 30 public health centres and dispensaries
included a structured interview with the in-charge, record reviews and exit
interviews. In addition, in-depth interviews were conducted with the in-charge
and HFC members at 12 facilities, and with district staff and other stakeholders.
DFF procedures were well established: HFCs met regularly and accounting
procedures were broadly followed. DFF made an important contribution to
facility cash income, accounting for 47% in health centres and 62% in
dispensaries. The main items of expenditure were wages for support staff
(32%), travel (21%), and construction and maintenance (18%). DFF was
perceived to have a highly positive impact through funding support staff such as
cleaners and patient attendants, outreach activities, renovations, patient referrals
and increasing HFC activity. This was perceived to have improved health worker
motivation, utilization and quality of care.
A number of problems were identified. HFC training was reportedly inadequate,
and no DFF documentation was available at facility level, leading to confusion.
Charging user fees above those specified in the national policy remained
common, and understanding of DFF among the broader community was very
limited. Finally, relationships between HFCs and health workers were sometimes
characterized by mistrust and resentment.
Relatively small increases in funding may significantly affect facility perfor-
mance when the funds are managed at the periphery. Kenya plans to scale up
DFF nationwide. Our findings indicate this is warranted, but should include
improved training and documentation, greater emphasis on community
engagement, and insistence on user fee adherence.
Keywords Kenya, health care financing, health facility committees, community
engagement, user fees
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406Introduction
Over the past two decades there has been increasing pressure
for the abolition or reduction of user fees for health
care because of the barrier to access they pose for the poor
(James et al. 2005; Lagarde and Palmer 2006; Save the Children
UK 2008; Yates 2009). However, reducing user fees can
have adverse effects by decreasing facility-level funds for
running costs while increasing workload, thus increasing drug
shortages and reducing staff morale, and negatively affecting
community engagement in facility governance (Gilson and
McIntyre 2005; James et al. 2006). Although primary health
care facilities are also funded through centrally allocated public
sector budgets, there is evidence that only a fraction of these
resources actually reach them, reflecting a combination
of inadequate funds, limited decentralization, bureaucratic
problems and corruption (Lindelow et al. 2006; Ministry of
Health 2007).
In Kenya, high and variable user fees were reduced in 2004
to flat rates of KES 10 or 20 (approximately US$0.15 or 0.29)
at dispensaries and health centres, respectively. Special groups
were exempted from fees, comprising under-fives, patients with
malaria, tuberculosis, HIV/AIDS and other sexually transmitted
infections, and those seeking maternal and child health
or delivery services. Although utilization was initially found
to increase, there were concerns that user fee reduction
had reduced facility-level funds and therefore the ability
of facility managers to respond to local problems (Pearson
2005).
To address these issues, the Kenyan Government and the
Danish International Development Agency (DANIDA) piloted
an innovative system of direct facility funding (DFF) of health
facilities in Coast Province. A similar approach has been used in
the education sector in Kenya and other countries following the
introduction of free primary education (Ayako 2006). However,
as far as we are aware, this approach has not been
implemented elsewhere at this level of the health sector.
We undertook an evaluation of the Coast pilot to explore the
implementation and perceived impact of DFF in health centres
and dispensaries. Although DFF was implemented in all health
facilities, we focused on health centres and dispensaries
because they are the facilities most utilized by poor rural
households, and direct funding mechanisms are novel at
this level.
Direct facility funding
The Ministry of Health (MoH) was the primary source of
support for all public health facilities in the country, providing
them with infrastructure, trained health workers, drug kits and
medical supplies. Since this study was completed the Ministry
of Health has been divided into two separate Ministries: the
Ministry of Medical Services and the Ministry of Public Health
and Sanitation. The latter is now responsible for health centres
and dispensaries. In addition, the District Health Management
Teams (DHMTs) receive an annual budget for district health
activities which mainly covers district-level activities such as
the DHMT office, training and supervision. Prior to the
introduction of DFF, the only cash income available to health
centres and dispensaries was from user fees or other income-
generating activities such as the sale of mosquito nets. The
introduction of DFF increased the income they controlled by
directly remitting additional funds to the facility level.
DFF has been piloted throughout Coast Province from mid-
2005 to date. Funds were allocated across districts using the
MoH Resource Allocation Criteria,
1 and within districts the
breakdown across facility types was 85% to health centres and
dispensaries, 10% to hospitals, and 5% to DHMTs to cover
supervision. All MoH facilities with qualified staff were entitled
to DFF, with funds allocated to individual facilities on the basis
of workload and facility type (health centres received more
than dispensaries).
The relationship between various DFF players and the flow of
funds is depicted in Figure 1. Funds were remitted directly into
the bank accounts of each facility and DHMT. The Provincial
Health Management Team (PHMT) had an oversight role,
supported by two Provincial Facility Grants Accountants
contracted specifically for DFF by DANIDA. At the district
level, the DHMT was responsible for DFF implementation, with
key actors being the District Medical Officer for Health
(responsible for overall supervision), the Facility Management
Nurse (supports links between facilities, the community and
the district) and the District Health Accountant (financial
management).
Each facility should already have had a Health Facility
Committee (HFC) in place, made up of local community members
and the facility in-charge, who were trained on the DFF scheme.
They prepared quarterly work plans and budgets, and were
responsibleforthemanagementofDFFfunds.Localcommunities
KEY MESSAGES
  An innovative system of direct facility funding (DFF) of government health centres and dispensaries has been piloted in
Coast Province, Kenya, to address the negative effects of reducing user fees.
  DFF was perceived to have a highly positive impact through funding support staff, outreach activities, renovations, patient
referrals and increasing health facility committee activity, which in turn was perceived to have improved health worker
motivation, utilization and quality of care.
  The main challenges associated with the scheme were confusion over DFF operations, the continued overcharging of user
fees, and very limited understanding of DFF among the broader community.
  Relatively small increases in funding managed at the peripheral level may have a significant impact on performance, but
must be accompanied by comprehensive training and documentation; strong emphasis on community engagement; and
insistence on user fee adherence.
DIRECT FUNDING OF HEALTH CENTRES AND DISPENSARIES 407were supposed to be empowered to monitor DFF through their
committee members and through the display of facility utilization
and accounts data on blackboards at health facilities.
DFF could be spent on 10 expenditure categories (Box 1). A
maximum of 30% of each facility’s funds could be spent on
travel allowances, and funds could not be used for drugs,
laboratory services, construction of new buildings or HFC
sitting allowances. Funds could be spent on support staff, but
not professionally trained health workers. Facilities were
supposed to comply with the national user fee policy in order
to receive DFF disbursements.
DFF formed part of a wider programme of DANIDA-funded
health systems strengthening conducted throughout Coast
Province since the early 2000s. This included training of
health workers and managerial staff, construction and renova-
tion, provision of equipment and supplies, strengthening the
District Health Management Team
(DMOH, FMN, DHA)  
Health facility
Community
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Reports to
Flow of Funds
Key
DMOH   = District Medical Officer of Health
DHA       = District Health Accountant
FMN       = Facility Management Nurse
Provincial Health Management Team
Provincial Facility
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DANIDA
Figure 1 Relationships among direct facility funding players
Box 1 Expenditure Items on which DFF could be used
Category Examples
Salaries for support staff Basic wages for cleaners, grounds men, watchmen, record clerks, nurse assistants
Utilities, supplies and services Electricity, water
Communications Telephone, airtime, postage
Domestic travel and subsistence allowances Staff travel costs and allowances, transfer of patients
Printing, advertising and information Photocopying, posters, advertising
Specialized materials and supplies Insecticides, oxygen, food rations
Office and general supplies and services Stationery, clearing materials
Fuel and lubricants Petrol, wood, charcoal
Other operating expenses Bank charges, contracted guards and cleaning services
Routine maintenance Vehicles, equipment, furniture and buildings, and other assets
408 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGdrug delivery system, enhancing community health activities
(including seed funds for income-generating activities and
strengthening of HFCs), and strengthening of health manage-
ment information systems (HMIS) and financial management
(Gethi and Wainaina 2007).
Methods
The conceptual framework in Figure 2 shows the hypothesized
pathways through which DFF could improve utilization and
quality of care. The framework was derived from the literature
and discussions with stakeholders, and guided data collection
and analysis.
Data were collected between October 2007 and March 2008,
2–3 years after the scheme was introduced. Two of the seven
districts in Coast Province were purposively sampled to reflect
likely diversity of experience with DFF implementation accord-
ing to managerial views. Their characteristics are summarized
in Table 1. It was not possible to assess the quantitative impact
on key indicators such as utilization and fees charged because
no baseline data had been collected. Historical HMIS data could
not be used as a baseline, because of the high frequency of
missing or incomplete records, and the recent upgrading of the
HMIS system in Coast, which meant that historical and current
HMIS data were not directly comparable. We addressed this
issue by focusing our quantitative analysis on intermediate/
Approval of Facility 
Committee
Functioning 
Training &
 Guidelines 
Facility Income
Support
& 
Supervision 
Facility Level
Expenditure 
Health Worker
 Motivation Fees & Exemptions
Improved Quality of
Services 
Increased
Utilization of
 Services 
Community
Engagement &
  Accountability 
Setup &
 Implementation 
Process 
Outcomes
Impact
Context: Facility type and staffing, experience with managing facility level funds, other MOH, NGO and
FBO activities, general political and economic developments   
Figure 2 Conceptual framework
Table 1 Characteristics of study districts
Characteristic Kwale Tana River
Estimated population in 2007
a 610 845 237 448
Main tribal groups Mostly Digo and Duruma, both of the
Mijikenda group
Pokomo, Orma, Waldei, Malakote,
Mnyoyaya, Somali
Climate Long rains March – July; short rains
November – December
Dry and semi-arid to the north; frequent
floods in the River Tana delta to the
south
Main economic activities Mainly food-crop farming and fishing; some
pastoralism
Mainly pastoralists to the north and
central; food-crop farming and fishing
along the river basin and delta
Number of hours’ drive from Provincial to
District headquarters
1 hour 5 hours
aSource: 2007 National Population Database maintained by Noor and colleagues, KEMRI-Wellcome Trust Research Programme, Nairobi.
DIRECT FUNDING OF HEALTH CENTRES AND DISPENSARIES 409process outcomes that could be easily linked to DFF (Figure 2),
while using qualitative methods to explore stakeholder opinions
on impact.
The sampling frame included all government health centres
and dispensaries eligible to receive DFF.
2A structured survey
comprising an interview with the facility in-charge, record
reviews and exit interviews was conducted at a sample of 15
facilities in each district, stratified by facility type. All five
health centres in Kwale and all four in Tana River were
automatically selected, and 10 of the 47 eligible dispensaries in
Kwale and 11 of the 25 in Tana River were randomly selected.
The in-charge interview assessed facility characteristics
and services provided, drug availability, financial and non-
financial resources, user fees and community engagement
mechanisms. The record review covered utilization, income
and expenditure over the period July 2006 to June 2007. Exit
interviews were conducted on the facility premises but away
from staff and HFC members. We aimed to select a convenience
sample of 10 exit interviewees seeking outpatient curative
services per facility, obtaining a total of 292 completed
questionnaires. The interview covered patient characteristics
and diagnosis, user fees paid and awareness of community
engagement strategies.
In addition, a subset of six facilities from each district where
the in-charge had been in post for at least 1 year was re-visited
for in-depth individual interviews with the facility in-charge,
and group discussions with a representative range of HFC
members. The six facilities were purposively selected to
encompass variation in facility type; accessibility to the district
headquarters; and performance on indicators from the struc-
tured survey (adherence to the user fee policy, activity of the
HFCs and completeness of HMIS records). Finally in-depth
interviews were conducted with DHMT and PHMT staff, and
one of the Provincial Facility Grants Accountants.
Quantitative data were double-entered using Fox-pro D-base
IV, MS Access or MS Excel, and imported into STATA version 9
for analysis. Where possible, qualitative interviews were
digitally recorded. Discussions were transcribed and imported
into N-Vivo 7 for coding and analysis. A coding scheme was
developed from the conceptual framework and from reading a
sub-set of the transcripts to identify the main themes.
Informed consent was obtained for all interviews, and the
study was approved by the Ethical Review Committees of the
Kenya Medical Research Institute and the London School of
Hygiene and Tropical Medicine.
Results
Table 2 summarizes interviewee characteristics. Exit intervie-
wees were seeking curative care for themselves (48%) or their
children (52%). Fifty-six per cent and 29% reported literacy
in Kiswahili and English, respectively.
All facilities offered outpatient curative services but only
five offered in-patient care (all health centres). The average
monthly outpatient utilization per facility for the period
July 2006 to June 2007 was 1750 for health centres and 799
for dispensaries. Although officially only facilities with qualified
staff were eligible for DFF, three facilities receiving funds
were managed by community health workers because
the qualified health workers were on leave or awaiting
replacement.
DFF set-up and implementation
Facility income
Table 3 shows the average annual cash income per facility
by funding source (excluding resources received in kind
from the central MoH or donors, such as staff, drugs and
Table 2 Characteristics of interviewees
Interviewees
Total
interviewed Female (%) Age (years) Occupation
b
District managers 7 1 (14) Not assessed DMOH: 2
FMN: 2
DHA: 1
DHAO: 1
PFGA: 1
In-charges 30 7 (23) Median 34 Clinical officer: 5 (17%)
Range 23–54 Registered nurse: 6 (20%)
Enrolled nurse: 16 (53%)
Community health worker: 3 (10%)
Exit interviewees
a 292 228 (78) 16–24 (35%) Not assessed
25–44 (44%)
Over 44 (11%)
Don’t know (10%)
HFC members 12 groups 13 (26) Not assessed; but a
wide range
Mostly peasant farmers, some retired civil servants,
retired chiefs and local politicians—mainly
councillors
50 participants
aWe aimed for 10 exit interviews per facility, but only 292 were completed because some facilities had very few clients on the survey day.
bDMOH¼District Medical Officer of Health; FMN¼Facility Management Nurse; DHA¼District Health Accountant; DHAO¼District Health Administrative
Officer; PFGA¼Provincial Facility Grants Accountant; HFC¼Health Facility Committee.
410 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGequipment). DFF contributed 56% of facility cash income, user
fees 34%, and sales of insecticide-treated nets and other sources
10%. The contribution of DFF at dispensaries was higher at 62%
compared with 47% at health centres. Most facilities reported
no problems in accessing the funds through their bank
accounts.
Funds were supposed to be allocated to facilities based
on workload. However, in Tana River HMIS, utilization data
were very limited, so instead allocations were based on DHMT
perceptions of how busy facilities were. This led to resentment
among some facility staff who felt their facility had been
misclassified. Later disbursements were also adjusted for the
catchment population.
Committee functioning
All facilities surveyed had active HFCs, composed of the in-
charge as secretary and between 8 and 18 community members
(median 11). Most members were farmers, though some were
professionals such as teachers, and a few were community
health workers. A small fraction of the members were female
(range 1–7; median 3), and their participation in discussions
ranged from very passive in Tana River to very active in Kwale.
HFC meetings were held regularly (every 1–3 months),
though a smaller executive committee often met more
frequently. All but three HFCs reported receiving sitting
allowances from user fee revenues, with a mean of KES 160
(US$2.36) per meeting (range KES 50–500 or US$0.74–7.37).
DHMT members reported that HFCs were in place before DFF
but had been relatively inactive, and most respondents
perceived that the operation of HFCs had improved since DFF
introduction. The existence of funds to manage was said to
have increased participation from HFC members and developed
their sense of facility ownership.
‘‘You know management without finance is not management at
all. Now if it couldn’t be this DANIDA [DFF] funds these
committees couldn’t be meeting often like that because they would
have nothing to discuss about or to budget for.’’ (Health worker)
Furthermore, DFF freed up user fee revenue to pay sitting
allowances, which was also said to have improved HFC activity.
‘‘Previously, we depended on the cost sharing [user fee] money only
and it was too little, just enough for drugs or syringes but not
allowances...members would not come for meetings because there
were no allowances.’’ (HFC member)
Relationships between in-charges and other HFC members were
generally good. For example, some in-charges valued the
opportunity to discuss issues with community members, and
felt that HFCs provided decisions with local legitimacy.
However, in a few cases, in-charges complained that HFC
members saw themselves as ‘watchdogs’ that were imposed on
the facility to supervise the staff:
‘‘The chairman and treasurer act as if they are watchdogs of the
facility staff. They are stubborn, and are always in the compound
monitoring what is happening, thus they are a nuisance.’’ (Health
worker)
‘‘...the committee believed the facility and the money belonged to
them...if you are told this [dispensary] is yours would you not
undermine the person working here...?’’ (Health worker)
DFF training and guidelines
The DFF training received by HFCs was highly valued.
However, problems emerged which pointed to shallow coverage
in certain key areas, such as the expenditure rules and financial
management. These problems were compounded by the lack of
any guidelines on DFF at the facility level. Nearly all health
workers reported problems with filling the cashbook. Many said
they could not understand the entries, and this forced them
to seek assistance from the District Health Accountant,
thereby interrupting service provision. Some district managers
admitted similar difficulties, referring to the cash book as ‘that
big book’:
‘‘I have a problem understanding those entries myself...’’ (District
manager)
In some facilities, DFF funds were not spent initially, even after
several disbursements, which DHMT members attributed to
confusion over expenditure guidelines.
‘‘Some were even afraid of spending the money because they heard
of strictness and the guidelines, and the procedures, so some had
apathy to use the funds. So I think it was somewhere around
midway that they had gained the courage, otherwise they used to
have accrued balances.’’ (District manager)
However, at the time of the study, some of these issues had
been resolved, reportedly allowing the intensity of supervision
to be reduced.
Support and supervision
The support of the Facility Management Nurses, District Health
Accountants and Provincial Facility Grants Accountants was
considered vital by DHMT members. Facility Management
Table 3 Average annual cash income per facility by source (July 2006 – June 2007) in US$
a
DFF US$ (%) User fees US$ (%)
Insecticide-treated
net sales US$ (%) Other
b US$ (%) Total US$ (%)
Dispensary 2802 (62) 959 (22) 221 (5) 516 (11) 4498 (100)
Health centre 4720 (47) 4838 (49) 280 (3) 44 (1) 9882 (100)
All facilities 3392 (56) 2092 (34) 236 (4) 339 (6) 6061 (100)
aUS$1¼KES67.80 in 2007.
bIncome from income-generating activities (rental income, tree-planting, selling of water, etc.) and/or other donations.
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and assisted committees in planning and evaluating progress.
District Health Accountants advised on budgeting and balancing
the cash book, received facilities’ monthly returns and helped
resolve accounting problems.
3 The two Provincial Facility Grants
Accountants each supervised three to four districts, ensuring
appropriate record keeping, assisting in the interpretation of DFF
rules and allowing flexibility where appropriate. Most DHMT
members said they spent a lot of time providing DFF accounting
support to facilities, but despite this increased workload, they
were positive about DFF, partly because the DHMT also received
DFF funds to facilitate supervision.
The districts differed in the degree of DHMT involvement in
planning DFF expenditure. In Kwale, HFCs decided how money
should be spent within the basic DFF rules, but in Tana River,
the DHMT distributed predetermined budget plans, allocating
funds by expenditure category. HFCs were allowed to request
alterations but this required DHMT approval. Some HFC
members felt these guidelines represented undue interference.
‘‘The community should not just be told you must spend this
money this way. They should decide for themselves—let it be a
bottom-up approach...’’ (HFC member)
Other respondents found the guidelines useful in decision-
making.
‘‘...there are no difficulties [in decision-making on expenditure]...
it can only be difficult if you give people room to budget without
some limitation...’’ (Health worker)
One in-charge said that guidelines reduced arguments, for
example where some HFC members wanted to use a dispro-
portionate amount on salaries in order to employ their contacts.
In general, interviewees reported that DFF accounting
procedures were functioning well. There were occasional
lapses, examples including an in-charge producing fake
receipts, a treasurer disappearing with funds and an in-charge
claiming to have spent money on facility upgrading which had
actually been donor funded. However, these were isolated cases
and had been addressed by the DHMT or Provincial Facility
Grants Accountants.
Process outcomes
Facility-level expenditure
Records from the Provincial Facility Grants Accountant showed
that facilities spent a high proportion (82%) of the DFF funds
disbursed. Figure 3 summarizes their expenditure. About a
third was on wages for support staff. Travel allowances
(transport costs, patient transfers, allowances for outreach
services and staff per-diems, etc.) accounted for about a fifth
(21%), and construction and maintenance of buildings,
furniture and equipment 18%.
The pattern of DFF expenditure was fairly similar across
districts, except for wages, which accounted for 40% and 22% in
Kwale and Tana River, respectively, and construction and
maintenance, which accounted for 7% and 33%. The top three
categories of expenditure were similar across facility type,
although dispensaries spent a higher proportion on travel
allowances (27%) compared with health centres (13%). The
pattern of expenditure for DFF was similar to that for other
facility income, the only important difference being that the
latter could be spent on drugs and sitting allowances, which
accounted for 13% and 11%, respectively, across all facilities.
Many HFC members felt that DFF resources should also be
used to fund drugs. They argued that centrally provided drug
supplies were inadequate, and indeed all facilities had a
stockout of at least one essential drug on the survey day.
Managerial staff reported that one reason for excluding
expenditure on drugs was that DANIDA was supporting other
drug procurement initiatives in the province.
Figure 3 Direct facility funding expenditure in health centres and dispensaries (July 2006–June 2007)
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in Table 4. DFF covered 33% of all staff, including cleaners,
watchmen, patient attendants, registration clerks and pharmacy
assistants. DFF salary contributions were particularly important
for dispensaries, where they funded over half of all personnel.
Health worker motivation
It was a common perception among health workers and DHMT
members that DFF had motivated health workers to work
better. First, health workers found it easier to perform their
jobs because of the help provided by support staff. Before DFF
health workers were obliged to engage in activities such as
registering clients, collecting funds and dispensing drugs, in
addition to clinical care. The improved staffing meant that even
though DFF was said to have increased the administrative
workload on health workers, few complained.
‘‘...if you check the workload, I could not do it alone...but because
I employed some people paid by DANIDA, you find that I am
comfortable. Even sometimes, I could take a day off to follow some
things in Kwale and when I come back...work is still going on
without me.’’ (Health worker)
Second, health workers felt that access to and control over DFF
funds enabled them to pay utility bills, purchase non-drug
supplies, make more timely decisions, resolve local problems
and plan more effectively:
‘‘...the mere fact that now they have some funds to manage...you
know that gives you some motivation somehow. Then...the fact
that at least to some extent they are in control of some of the
activities and damage control measures: because when something
runs out you can easily say now you are going to purchase it
without consulting the DMOH [District Medical Office of Health]
or the PMO [Provincial Medical Officer].’’ (District manager)
However, apparently most important for motivation was the
provision of travel allowances for outreach activities or visits to
the district headquarters.
‘‘There was motivation because before [DFF] staff were being forced
to go out on outreaches with no transport and no lunches.
Nowadays there is no problem and if you tell someone to go for an
outreach, they are happy to go...now there is no such problem
almost everybody is motivated.’’ (Health worker)
Together, these features led to DFF reportedly increasing staff
ability to meet DHMT targets in areas such as immunization,
facility-based deliveries and antenatal attendance, as described
below under perceived impact.
Fees and exemptions
According to the national user fee policy, a patient visiting a
dispensary or health centre should have paid KES 10 or 20
(2007 US$0.15 or 0.29), respectively, for all services received,
except those exempted from all charges (under-fives, patients
with malaria, HIV/AIDS, TB or sexually transmitted infections
(STIs), and maternal and child health and delivery clients). In-
charges were asked what they charged for a list of tracer cases
based on these categories (Table 5).
No single facility complied with the policy across all cases.
The only category which was reportedly always charged
appropriately was deliveries. The poorest adherence was for
patients with STIs (3/30), and adults with malaria (5/30). The
frequency of overcharging was supported by exit interview data,
with clients reportedly paying a median of KES 5 per child
(range KES 0–45), and KES 10 per adult (range KES 0–150).
Interviewees said that DFF had not changed charging
practices, with the exception of one dispensary, where the
in-charge claimed to have reduced fees from KES 20 to KES 10
per consultation.
Some health workers said they did not adhere to the policy
because DFF funds were insufficient for running the facilities;
as exempted patients formed the bulk of their clients, not
charging them would have a major impact on revenue. Others
blamed non-adherence on a lack of clarity in the communica-
tion of the policy:
‘‘...no formal communication was done by the Ministry, it was
just announced over the radio that we waive the under-fives and
such kind of thing. So when a government officer comes here to ask
me why I am charging the under-fives and [I respond] you know
an announcement over the radio is not the policy of the
government, that is an announcement of KBC (Kenya
Table 4 Number of staff by source of salary
a,b
Source of salary District Type of facility TOTAL n (%)
Kwale n (%) Tana River n (%) All dispensaries n (%) All health centres n (%)
MoH
c 92.5 (53.6) 50 (45.0) 38.5 (31.4) 104 (64.7) 142.5 (50.3)
DFF
d 49.5 (28.7) 44.7 (40.3) 64.2 (52.4) 30 (8.6) 94.2 (33.2)
User fees 22.5 (13.0) 11.3 (10.2) 14.8 (12.1) 19 (11.8) 33.8 (11.9)
NGO
e 3 (1.7) 3 (2.7) 1 (0.8) 5 (3.1) 6 (2.1)
Volunteers 5 (2.9) 2 (1.8) 4 (3.3) 3 (1.9) 7 (2.5)
TOTAL 172.5 (100) 111 (100) 122.5 (100) 161 (100) 283.5 (100)
aIncludes both staff centrally employed by the MoH and those hired locally as support staff.
bWhere an employee’s salary was funded by more than one source, their time was allocated proportionately.
cEmployer of all technical staff and some support staff.
dEmployer of support staff only.
eNon-governmental organization.
DIRECT FUNDING OF HEALTH CENTRES AND DISPENSARIES 413Broadcasting Corporation). (Laughter) So right away, we do not
have a written real documentary directive that [we] don’t charge
under-fives.’’ (Health worker)
Some DHMT members said they would allow HFCs to charge
higher fees or levy fees on exempted groups if the facility was
in need, on condition that the community agreed.
Community engagement and accountability
As noted above, HFCs were generally functioning well and were
perceived to have become more active with the introduction of
DFF. HFC members felt they provided an important link
between the facility and the community. One health worker
noted that this relationship was enhanced by the employment
of community members as support staff.
However, just under half of exit interviewees (46%) were
aware of the existence of their HFC, only 26% reported knowing
a committee member and only 16% said they knew the
chairman (Table 6). There were also some examples of
breakdowns in trust between the HFC and the broader
community. In one case, HFC members complained that
community members were suspicious over their handling of
facility funds.
‘‘...The treasurer resigned...he was fed up with the rumours that
money was being ‘eaten’...’’ (Health worker)
Members of another HFC reported being accused by the
community of developing negative attitudes towards them by
virtue of being in the committee. At the same time, HFC
members felt the community did not understand the DFF rules
and therefore made inappropriate demands:
‘‘...once they heard the facility was receiving some money, the
community wanted us to make contributions to projects...they do
not understand that the money is used within guidelines...’’ (HFC
member)
Twenty-seven of the 30 facilities surveyed had a blackboard,
clearly visible to clients in 25 facilities. Facility staff were
supposed to complete the blackboard table with monthly data
on health and utilization (e.g. number vaccinated, under-
weight, births and deaths, etc.), and accounts (income,
expenditure, cash in hand, cash in bank).
We defined blackboards as ‘complete’ if all columns were filled
up to the month before last. Of the 24 blackboards where these
data were collected,
4 only three had ‘complete’ information on
health and utilization; 18 facilities had partial information, and
three none. No facility had complete financial information: six
had partial information, while the other 18 were blank. Reasons
given for incomplete information included lack of time due to the
administrative burden on staff, and the fear that filling in
financial data would increase the risk of theft:
‘‘...we found that the financial information is a bit sensitive...we
advise them not to fill as they can put themselves at risk...the
community has a crime problem... They can come and slaughter
the in-charge...’’ (District manager)
Only 39% of exit interviewees said they had ever read the
information on the blackboard, and when asked what the
Table 6 Community members’ knowledge of HFCs
District Type of facility Total (n¼292)
Kwale (n¼142) Tana River (n¼150) Dispensary (n¼202) Health centre (n¼90)
Ever heard of HFC, n (%) 48 (34) 87 (58) 101 (50) 34 (38) 135 (46)
Know HFC chairman
a, n (%) 13 (9) 35 (23) 39 (19) 9 (10) 48 (16)
Know any HFC member
a, n (%) 25 (18) 50 (33) 56 (28) 19 (21) 75 (26)
aNot necessarily by name.
Table 5 Number of facilities adhering to user fee policy
a,b
Category District Type of facility TOTAL (n¼30)
Kwale (n¼15) Tana River (n¼15) Dispensaries (n¼21) Health centres (n¼9)
Child with malaria 13 9 13 9 22
Adult with malaria 2 3 2 3 5
Child with pneumonia 12 8 13 7 20
Adult with pneumonia 13 10 16 7 23
Adult with tuberculosis 10 12 16 6 22
Adult with gonorrhoea 1 2 2 1 3
Woman at first antenatal visit 15 13 20 8 28
Mother requiring delivery 15 15 21 9 30
All cases 0 0 0 0 0
aBased on reports of in-charges.
bThese figures do not include lab charges, as it was not clear from the user fee policy whether lab services should be free for exempted patients.
414 HEALTH POLICY AND PLANNINGboards displayed, only 21% and 18% were able to mention
the presence of utilization and financial data, respectively.
Views on the usefulness of the boards were mixed. Some HFC
and DHMT members said they led to greater transparency in
the way funds were utilized and this was beneficial to the
community. Members from two HFCs said they now found they
got fewer questions from the community about finances as this
information was displayed on the boards. However, some
interviewees felt the boards were not relevant to the local
community.
‘‘These are valuable for donors and for the educated but not for the
local community who are mostly illiterate: they wouldn’t know its
significance.’’ (District manager)
Perceived impact on quality of care and utilization
Interviewees felt that DFF had a significant positive impact on
both quality of care and utilization, mainly through influencing
health worker motivation and facility expenditure as described
above. For example, the ability to employ more support staff
reportedly led to improved safety and cleanliness, and reduced
waiting times and staff fatigue. Greater access to and decision-
making over DFF funds were said to have contributed to
maintaining non-drug supplies at adequate levels, and to have
indirectly led to improved drug stocks.
5 The use of DFF funds to
renovate buildings, create space for specific services such as
laboratory and pharmacy, fence compounds, install security
gates, and purchase doors, cabinets, cupboards and locks, was
said to have improved storage of drugs, stationery and
equipment, and provided more comfortable working conditions
for staff and waiting bays for patients. Overall, the environment
was felt to have become safer and more attractive for both
clients and staff.
Utilization was also felt to have risen due to the increase in
outreach services, facilitated by the provision of fuel and
allowances. Indeed all facilities except one reported outreach
services in the previous quarter. Outreach was felt by both
DHMT staff and health workers to be important in increasing
coverage of services such as immunization and antenatal care,
enabling health education and increasing awareness of and
demand for services among those living far from facilities. In
Kwale, health facilities had reportedly extended their opening
hours since the introduction of DFF, also increasing utilization.
It had become more common to open on weekends and there
were more frequently staff on call overnight.
The range of factors perceived to have linked DFF to
improved quality of care and utilization, and the centrality of
staff motivation as both an influence and outcome, were
illustrated by one health manager:
‘‘...if you have a devastated facility even getting clients there might
be difficult. Keeping it clean will also be difficult and infection
prevention would be difficult if you only maybe do everything from
one table: you keep your injections there, tablets there; you have no
cupboards to lock some of your drugs, etc. It’s very difficult to
operate in such a situation. But at least when the building is
painted it looks neat and clean. The staff are motivated and the
community feels like they want to come and everything then moves
well.’’ (District manager)
Discussion
This study has demonstrated that direct funding can be
implemented successfully at health centres and dispensaries,
providing a mechanism to transfer funds to the periphery of the
health system. HFCs, comprising a fair mix of community
representatives, were active and able to manage the funds
reasonably well. DFF was perceived to have had a highly
positive impact by the great majority of the respondents.
Utilization of facilities was thought to have increased, especially
through the expanded outreach programmes, thus improving
access to health services. Although this resulted in a heavy
workload for staff, there were no complaints as the increased
workload was offset by the improved working environment
through availability of supplies and improved infrastructure,
the ability to hire more support staff and the provision of
allowances.
DFF contributed a large share of the facilities’ cash income,
though user fees were also important, especially at health
centre level. However, compared with the full costs of running
health centres and dispensaries, DFF represents only a small
proportion. Wang’ombe and Mugo estimated the average
annual recurrent costs of dispensaries in Coast Province to
be US$21920 (range US$19311–27123), with those of health
centres US$228222 (range US$41779–347715) (Wang’ombe
and Mugo 2006),
6 meaning that average DFF income
would be equivalent to only 12.8% of total recurrent costs
in dispensaries (range 10.3–14.5%) and 2.1% (range 1.4–11.3%)
in health centres. This implies that relatively small
increases in funding may have a significant impact on
performance when the additional funds are managed at this
peripheral level.
The main limitation of this study was the lack of baseline
data due to the timing of the study and the inadequacies and
recent changes in the routine HMIS. As a result, it was not
possible to validate the positive perceptions of DFF impact that
we documented with quantitative data on utilization and
quality of care. However, we have reasonable confidence in
the validity of these perceptions due to the in-depth nature of
the qualitative interviews conducted, and the careful documen-
tation of the set-up, implementation and process outcomes
(Figure 2) which would have been required to achieve such
results. Nonetheless, it is possible that respondents may have
wanted to present DFF in a positive light in order to encourage
the continued flow of funds. In addition, in providing their
views on DFF impact, respondents may have attributed to DFF
beneficial outcomes resulting from other elements of the
DANIDA-funded health systems strengthening programme in
Coast Province, such as a separate facility renovation project or
the attempts to strengthen the drug supply system.
A number of problems with DFF implementation were
highlighted. First, HFC training was inadequate, particularly
in the area of financial management, and relevant guidelines at
facility level were completely lacking. Secondly, facilities were
not adhering to the national user fees policy. Many continued
to levy charges above the prescribed fees and failed to exempt
patients such as the under-fives and those with malaria. These
charges contravened the national policy but were considered
‘official’ at the facility level, where they were often agreed with
the HFC, and sometimes with the DHMT. However, the over-
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charges may have been unwilling to disclose fully deviation
from the national policy, or may have been charging additional
informal fees for their personal gain.
Although the operations of HFCs were reported to have
improved since DFF introduction, only a minority of exit
interviewees were well informed about their activities. No major
cases of fraud were reported, but the acknowledgment by HFC
members that the community knew very little about DFF also
raises concerns about transparency. On the other hand, it is
possible that the low education level of the community and lack
of interest in health facility matters led to challenges in
communicating relevant information.
The use of blackboards to present utilization and financial
information to patients and the community in general is
innovative. However, the utility of that information for
community members is unclear, since almost half the exit
interviewees were not literate in Kiswahili, and the boards were
rarely completely filled, especially for the financial information.
It was unclear how community members should interpret some
of the HMIS data. For instance, does an increase in outpatient
cases represent a success because utilization increased, or a
failure because disease incidence is higher? The financial
information was also limited to bank account totals with no
information on how facility funds had been spent.
Some similar successes and challenges have been documented
during the direct funding of schools to facilitate provision of
free primary education, implemented nationwide in Kenya and
other African countries (Ayako 2006; Nyamute 2006). The
funds were transferred directly to school bank accounts, and
were managed by local committees, made up of school staff and
parents, whose roles included allocating funds within the
government guidelines and awarding tenders for school
supplies. As with DFF, evaluations of these programmes also
reported that the direct financing was well received, but
problems were identified with inadequate training of school
heads, leading to weaknesses in financial management skills,
some conflict between school staff and local committee
members, and a general failure to sensitize the wider
community to their role. Additional problems documented in
the education sector, but not in health, included slow
disbursement of funds, poor monitoring leading to misalloca-
tion of resources and embezzlement, and political interference.
The fact that these types of problems were not widely reported
in the health sector DFF may reflect the strong support and
supervision provided in Coast and the smaller scale of the
province-wide pilot.
The merits of DFF should be considered in relation to
alternative mechanisms for financing peripheral health facil-
ities, such as increasing central allocations to the district level,
raising user fees, and introducing community-based health
insurance and performance-based financing initiatives.
Traditionally, health centres and dispensaries have been
mainly financed through central allocations to the district.
However, Public Expenditure Tracking Studies have demon-
strated the difficulties in monitoring such flows, and ensuring
that they are not delayed for bureaucratic reasons, diverted to
other priorities or leaked from the system (Lindelow et al.
2006; Ministry of Health 2007). User fees have been widely
used internationally, and continue to be an important source of
facility revenue in Kenya. However, there is increasing
consensus that they have a significantly negative impact on
utilization, especially by the poor (James et al. 2006; Lagarde
and Palmer 2006; Meessen et al. 2007; Lagarde and Palmer
2008). Exemption policies to facilitate access for poorer groups
are seldom well-implemented (Meessen et al. 2006).
Community-based health insurance presents an alternative
funding mechanism with the potential to provide some
financial protection by reducing out-of-pocket spending.
However, to date it has generally operated on a small scale,
disadvantaged populations have been less able to enrol in such
schemes and there is little or no evidence that schemes have an
effect on the quality of care or the efficiency with which care is
produced (Ekman 2004; Carrin et al. 2005).
DFF funds were allocated across facilities based only on
facility type and reported utilization. An alternative approach
would be to make funding levels dependent on performance on
key indicators, such as coverage of vaccinations or supervised
deliveries. Evidence on such performance-based financing
mechanisms in health in low- and middle-income countries is
still weak, though some recent projects in Rwanda and the
Democratic Republic of Congo have shown encouraging results
on quality and coverage of selected services and improved
health worker performance (Meessen et al. 2007; Johannes
et al. 2008). Concerns with performance-based financing
include the administrative and financial burden and the
potential for fraudulent performance reports. In addition there
is a risk of perverse incentives such as encouraging supplier-
induced demand; diverting health workers from unmonitored
but equally important activities; compromising of quality in
order to maximize output; and focusing on easier-to-reach
populations (Eichler 2006; Meessen et al. 2007; Save the
Children UK 2008). The Kenya DFF experience indicates that
even without performance targets, an increase in funding at
peripheral levels may have a positive impact on utilization and
quality. Little is known, however, about the relative cost-
effectiveness of these financing options, highlighting the
importance of large-scale rigorous studies in future.
Policy implications
These positive findings from this provincial-level pilot indicate
that scale up of the current system is warranted, and that the
level of funding per facility could also be increased, as
absorptive capacity was high and HFCs had constructive ideas
on how extra funds could be utilized. Indeed, the Kenyan
Government plans to roll out DFF throughout the country in
2010. One would expect the findings from this pilot to be
generalizable to other areas of Kenya, as Coast is one of the
poorest provinces and contains a mixture of relatively accessible
and inaccessible districts, and a wide variety of population
groups. However, Coast has benefited from DANIDA health
systems support since 2000 and could therefore be considered
atypical in some respects. For example, the drug delivery system
was strengthened, infrastructure was improved and facility
management heavily supported by the DANIDA-funded Facility
Management Nurses (Gethi and Wainaina 2007). It is clear that
the support and supervision provided by the Facility
Management Nurse, District Health Accountant and particularly
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ensuring that funds were spent according to plans, problems
were resolved quickly and accounting procedures followed. To
replicate the successes in Coast, similar support will be required
in other provinces. Furthermore, the pilot in Coast Province was
on a relatively small scale, and funds were easily transferred
from DANIDA into individual facility accounts. Nationwide
implementation will face a more significant set of legal and
bureaucratic challenges in establishing financial flow and
accountability mechanisms that are acceptable to the MoH
and the Treasury, and are compatible with existing financial
regulations.
In addition, there is scope to strengthen three areas of DFF
implementation and operations.
Training and documentation. The successful implementation of
DFF requires a simple, clear manual for HFC members and
health workers. This could reduce confusion about DFF
operation and so increase trust between key actors. We suggest
that it should cover HFC roles, procedures for elections,
operations of DFF including accounting for funds, rules on
how funds can be used and information that should be
provided for community members. In addition, there should
be comprehensive training of HFC members and health workers
focusing on key elements of DFF operation. This should be
done both before the first tranche of funds is disbursed and
repeated periodically to refresh the skills of past trainees and
introduce new health workers and HFC members to DFF.
Community engagement. Our results point to the need to clarify
what the broader community needs to know regarding DFF,
and to decide on appropriate mechanisms of communication.
While the blackboards have some potential, the information
currently displayed is relatively difficult for community mem-
bers to interpret and use. Their utility could be improved by
displaying information more relevant to community needs, such
as the names and villages of residence of the HFC members, a
simple description of HFC roles, facility income per quarter
(DFF, user fees and others) and facility expenditure per quarter
by line item.
User fees. It was expected that DFF would increase adherence
to the user fee policy, but overcharging remained common,
representing a missed opportunity to improve equity of access.
The following steps are therefore proposed to improve
adherence. First, the policy should be clarified by the provision
of a clear MoH document listing all the applicable fees, which
should be displayed at all health facilities. Secondly, adherence
to the policy should be made a key part of DFF training,
including evidence on the deterrent effects of fees, especially to
the poorest, and the ineffectiveness of waiver schemes. Finally,
the receipt of DFF funds should be made conditional on user
fees adherence. It should also be noted that DFF could provide
a mechanism for compensating facilities for lost revenue in the
event that a decision to abolish user fees completely is made in
Kenya.
Greater debate is needed on two areas, both relating to DFF
expenditure rules.
Degree of HFC autonomy over allocation of funds. A key question is
whether HFCs should be given a free reign within basic rules as
in Kwale or provided with a predetermined budget plan as in
Tana River. Greater regulation could be argued to undermine
autonomy and community involvement, but could also simplify
decision making and potentially improve community relations.
It could also be argued that although HFCs are close to the
facility and the community, they lack the public health training
required to make unfettered judgements between competing
priorities.
Drug purchase. Drug stockouts have been argued to be a major
constraint, with a negative impact on utilization and quality of
care. Currently, drugs can be purchased using user fee revenue
but not DFF, partly reflecting the fact that DANIDA was
supporting other initiatives to improve drug availability in Coast
Province. This has led to demands from some HFCs to allow
DFF funds to be spent on drugs. This issue requires careful
debate. On the positive side, allowing DFF spending on drugs
could have a positive impact on quality of care and utilization,
and remove a temptation to overcharge user fees. On the
other hand, allowing more local drug purchase could lead
to inappropriate and poor quality drug procurement, and
potentially undermine efforts to strengthen drug delivery
systems.
Finally, this study provides important lessons for the planned
scale-up of DFF in Kenya and for similar initiatives elsewhere.
However, in view of the lack of quantitative impact data,
further research is clearly warranted, to assess impact, costs
and value for money, and to facilitate comparison with other
funding mechanisms for health centres and dispensaries. Such
studies should at a minimum have baseline and follow-up data,
preferably a control group, and ideally a randomized design.
They should be suitably powered to obtain statistically robust
findings and include qualitative data to facilitate the inter-
pretation of results. This must go alongside the strengthening
of routine HMIS, to facilitate on-going monitoring and
evaluation and to ensure that future studies can rely on these
data for historical trends in key outcomes such as utilization
and user fee revenue.
Endnotes
1 The resource allocation criteria are based on poverty levels, new AIDS
cases, number of women of reproductive age, number of
government facilities, number of under-fives and area (sq km).
2 Excluding five dispensaries in Kwale that had been involved in
another recent study.
3 Tana River’s District Health Accountant had left and his role was being
covered by the Facility Management Nurse.
4 Not recorded for one facility.
5 Although DFF could not be used to purchase drugs, interviewees
reported that DFF could lead indirectly to improved drug stocks
because it reduced competing demands for user fee revenue, which
could then be channelled towards drug procurement.
6 Wang’ombe and Mugo’s costs have been converted to 2007 US$ using
the Kenyan GDP deflator, and the average US$/KES exchange rate
for 2007. The recurrent costs include all personnel, training,
transport, utilities, drugs and other medical and non-medical
supplies and services.
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